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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GARLEN E. DOUGLAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JACK I. GIGANDET,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET,
Intervenor and Appellant.

CASE NO. 8876

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the verdict of the jury and
the judgment of the lowGr court rendered on the 26th
day of February, 1957 in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant Jack I. Gigandet on his counterclaim ''no cause of action'' and from the verdict of
the jury and judgment of the lower court in favor of
the plaintiff and against the Intervenor, Mrs. Phyllis
Gigandet on her cross complaint ''no cause of action.''
Thereafter, appellants filed a motion for a new trial
which motion was denied by the Court on or about the
18th day of March, 1958.
The facts are as follows: That on or about the 22nd
day of June, 1956, on a highway known and designated as
Highway No. 160 at a point approximately seven miles
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North of Monticello, S.an Juan County, Utah a collision
occurred between a 1954 Jeep Pickup truck being driven
by the plaintiff-respondent and a 1952 Dodge Sedan
being driven by the defendant-appellant Jack I. Gigandet.
That the Intervenor-appellant, Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet,
was .a passenger in the Dodge Sedan Automobile owned
and operated by her husband. Plaintiff sued the defendant Jack I. Gigandet to recover for damages to his truck.
Mr. Gigandet filed his answer denying liability and
counterclaiming for damages to his car and for personal
injuries. Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet intervened and filed her
cross-complaint for her damages from personal injuries.
Appellants were residents of Toledo, Ohio, (Tr. 50)
and were on a vacation trip en route to Salt Lake City
and to Bryce, Zion .and Grand Canyon Parks. They
spent the night in Cortez, Colorado and left there at
approximately 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock the morning of the
accident. The weather was clear and the road dry and
visibility was good. They had left Toledo the previous
Friday and had been on the road approximately eight
days. That during this period of time )Irs. Gigandet
had driven the car three or four hours (Tr. 51).
That when appellant, Jack I Gigandet, first smY
respondent's truck it was in the right hand lane in
normal driving position ,and was being driven straight
ahead down the road (Tr. 51 & 52) and was "'a couple
of hundred feet'' ahead proceeding in the same direction,
that, when appellant saw the road w.as clear for passing
he pulled out into the passing lane when all of a sudden
respondent turned. That there was nothing to indicate
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respondent was going to turn, the road was clear, there
was no indication of any traffic, or any side road or
signs, or any slowing down on the respondents part.
That he was about three car lengths from him when
respondent suddenly turned left in front of him without
any warning and he saw that he was going to hit the
truck. He hit his brakes and wheeled back toward the
right of the road so that he would not hit the cab. ( Tr.
54). That prior to the accident he had been driving
between 50 and 55 miles per hour and laid down skid
marks from application of brakes (Tr. 57) and that the
brakes were in good condition (Tr. 58) and that the
speed limit was 60 miles per hour.
Mrs. Gigandet testified that she did not observe any
signal for a turn of plaintiff's-respondent's Truck. That
she had not been driving that morning. That she had
driven a car for at least twelve years prior to the time
of the accident.
The extent of the damage done to appellant's automobile and the extent of the personal injuries to appellant
and to Intervenor are not material to a discussion or to
the presentation of this appeal and hence .are omitted.

ARG Ul\1EN~_,
POINT 1.
ERROR IN LAW OCCURRING AT THE TRIAL OF SAID
CAUSE AND DULY EXCEPTED TO BY THE DEFENDANT
AND THE INTERVENOR.
POINT 2.
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
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AND AGAINST THE INTERVENOR BASED UPON THE
FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT, JACK I. GIGANDET AND
HIS WIFE, MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET WERE ENGAGED
IN A JOINT VENTURE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
POINT 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING INTERVENOR'S
AND DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS.
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8.
POINT 4.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS.
3, 5, and 11.
POINT 5.
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
THE VERDICTS AND THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED IN
SAID CAUSE AND THAT SAID VERDI·CTS ARE AGAINST
THE LAW.

These points are so closely related, and the facts so
interwoven that we shall consolidate them for purposes
of this argument.
There are two questions presented to the ·Court by
this appeal. They are :
(1) Was the defendant Jack I. Gigandet guilty of
Contributory Negligence in the operation of his autmnobile at the time of the .accident and (2) whether his
Contributory Negligence, if any, could be imputed to his
wife who was riding as a passenger in his car.
1. Was the defendant-appellant, Jack I. Gigandet
guilty of contributory negligence~
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It is the contention of appellants that an emergency
situation as to him was presented by the acts and conduct
of the respondent. It must he borne in mind that the
appellants were tourists in the area, and that they had
no notice of any hazardous conditions existing at the
point of the impact. They saw respondent approximately
two hundred feet before the .accident and there was
nothing about his driving to indicate that he intended to
do anything but to continue along the main highway.
Both the appellants were alert. There was nothing to
distract them, driving conditions were excellent, and
there appears to he no reason at all why they could not
have seen a signal for a turn, if, in fact, such a signal
had been given.

Appellant, Jack I. Gigandet, testified as follows :

'' Q. Now will you describe the, your activities and your movernents in your own car beginning at the time when you first observed him ?
A. Well, I saw him and I stayed in my lane
for a few moments and then I saw the road was
cle.ar and I pulled out into the passing lane, into
the left hand lane, which I don't know that I got
completely out in there when all of a sudden Mr.
Douglas turned. There was nothing to indicate
that he was going to turn and that was why I
was passing him. rrhe ro,ad was clear' there was
no indication of any traffic or any side road or
any slowing down on his part. There was clear
road ahead.
Q.

Did you observe any

A.

No, sir.

signs~
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Q.

State what happened,

please~

A. Well, when I pulled out I got up to about
three cars length from him. I was about three car
lengths from him when all of a sudden he turned
and he had been going slow. I noticed that from
the top of the hill there that he didn't appear to
be changing speed, or I saw no braking. No brake
signal or anything like that, and when I got up
there about three to, two and a half car lengths
from him, something like that from him, all of a
sudden he turned ieft in front of me without any
warning. And I saw I was going to hit him. I hit
my brakes and saw I was going to hit him and I
wheeled back toward the right of the road so I
would possibly not hit the cab that he was riding
in. I didn't want to take the chance on hurting
him." (Tr. 52, 53)
Mrs. Gigandet was riding in the front seat and she
testified as follows :

"Q. Did you observe Plaintiff's truck at any
ti1ne irnn1ediately prior to the accident~
A. The first time I noticed the truck was
when we came over the hill and I noticed the
truck at that time.

Q. When you say over the hill, that was the
hill approaching the accident~
A.

Yes.

Q.

Accident scene was it 1

A.

Yes.

Q. State what, if anything, you observed
your husband do as it refers to the moment, the
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movement of your car immediately prior to the
accident~

A. Well, we came down the hill and came up
close behind Mr. Douglas' truck, and Jack was
preparing to pass him and he started to pull out
into the left hand lane and as he did that Mr.
Douglas turned in front of us and at that time
Jack turned back and he hit the back end of the
truck.

Q.

Did you observe all these

A.

That's right.

things~

Q. Now during that period of time did you
observe any signal for a turn of the Plaintiff's
truck~

A.

I did not see any signal of any kind.

Q.

What was the visibility that

day~

A. It was a very good day. Sun was shining,
it was bright.

Q.

About what time of the day was

this~

A. It was in the morning around 9 o'clock I
believe.

Q.

Had you been driving the car that morn-

A.

No, sir.

Q.

You do drive .an automobile do you not?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How long have you been

ing~

driving~

A. My husband taught me when he was in
the service, I imagine, Oh at least twelve years."
(Tr. 74, 75)
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Contrast this testimony with that of the respondent
as it relates to his conduct before attempting to make
·a left turn onto a side road. He stated that it was his
intention to turn off on a side road that leads to Peters
Point and that he looked in his mirror and saw no traffic,
turned on his signal light and stepped on his brakes. With
respect to his looking in the rear view mirror it is apparent that if he in fact looked in the mirror he failed to
see what he should have seen or that he failed to look
immediately before he turned. With reference to his
signal for a left turn we invite the Court's attention to
his testimony on Cross examination with reference to a
written statement he made .at the time of the accident.

"Q. At the time you signed it do you know
the contents of it~
A.

Yes, sir. I remember it.

Q. I want to call your attention to one statement in there. And this is taken frmn this statement that bears your signature. I was driving
about ten to fifteen miles per hour and when I
was about a hundred to a hundred fifty feet to
the South of the road I was going to turn to, I
was going to turn to the left. or \Yest on this old
dirt road. I th~nk I turned on 1ny turn lights indicating a left turn. However, I do not knozc for
sure. I .always do turn on 1ny lights and I assume
I did this time. (Tr. -17) (Italics ours)

That respondent was negligent cannot now be questioned and the jury found hin1 so. It is the contention
of appellants that the sole and proxi1nate cause of the
accident was the negligence of respondent and that there
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was no sufficient evidence upon which the jury was
justified in finding appellant Jack I. Gigandet guilty of
Contributory Negligence in causing the accident.
With reference to the so called intersection at the
point of collision, the Court gave Instruction No. 3 as
follows:
''You are instructed, Lady .and Gentlemen of
the Jury, that as the Defendant approached the
Jeep truck of the Plaintiff for passing he had a
duty:
(a) To use due care to observe that the
Jeep truck of the Plaintiff was approaching a
point at which a side road departed from the highway on which he was traveling;
(b) If the circumstances were such that he
observed, or in the exerise of reasonable and ordinary care should have observed that there was a
roadway intersecting with that on which he was
driving, he had no right under the law to attempt
a passing of the Plaintiff's Jeep truck at a point
within one hundred feet of the point of departure
or intersection of such road;
(c) To keep such a lookout as .an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent driver of an automobile
would keep under the same or similar circumstances to become aware of the location upon the
highway of the Jeep truck of the Plaintiff and to
become aware of any signals being given by the
Plaintiff, if any, to indicate his intention to turn
upon said road;
(d) To proceed at no greater speed than
was reasonable and safe, having due regard to the
conditions as disclosed by the evidence and any
actual or potential hazards, if any, then existing.
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If the Defendant violated his duty in any one
or more of the particulars stated .above, he would
be guilty of negligence.
If your minds are satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence and that the Defendant,
Jack I. Gigandet, was guilty of negligence in one
or more of the particulars stated above and that
such negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the collision, then you should find a verdict for
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and assess
his damages at the sum of $691.39.'' * * * (R. 81)
(Italics ours)
We submit that this instruction pl.aced a higher
degree of duty upon appellant than was justified under
the conditions. There was nothing to indicate to him that
a private road or driveway intersected the main highway
at that point. There was testimony that a stop sign was
lying on the ground at that point. \Ye call attention to a
few facts which should be considered by the Court.
There is no evidence, whatsoever, that the so-called
Peter Point Road was a '"street or highway" as defined
by Section 41-6-7 U·CA 1953 and presumably falls within
the definition of a "Private road or driveway". The evidence was that it was a dirt road with gravel approach..
There was nothing to indicate to the public that said
road was in existence. The take off point was between
two white highway n1arkers. Grass and weeds hid any
indication of said road on the .approach frmn the South.
It appears frmn the testimony and exhibits that the road
took off on an angle frmn the 1nain highway in a southwesterly direction-opposite to the direction of appellants direction of travel and that it dipped downward

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
from the main highway. There were no signs indicating
a turn-off road, the center lines of the main highway were
against passing to traffic proceeding south on the high·
way but the broken line allowed passing to tr.affic proceeding north. There was testin10ny that a "stop sign"
was down and lying off to the side of the highway.
V.,T e respectfully call the court's attention to plaintiff's Exhibits B and C which are pictures of the general
.area & which conclusively show that there was nothing
to indicate to appellants that a side road existed. They
also show the general grade and highway markings. We
agree with appellant when in .answer to a question on
cross-examination he stated as follows.
'' Q. Did you ever see this intersecting road
at all before the accident~

A. No. In fact, I was out just a week ago and
I still didn't see the road until it was called to
my attention." (Tr. 66, 67)

It would appear that the lower court's instruction
was based upon Sec. 41-6-58 UCA 1953 which is as follows:
'' (a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven
to the left side of the roadway under the following
conditions: * * * *
(2) When appro.aching within 100 feet of
or traversing any intersection or railroad grade
crossing."
Section 41-6-59 UCA 1953 then provides

~s

follows:

''Signs indication passing zones-The state
road commission is authorized to determine those
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portions of any highway where overtaking and
passing or driving to the left of the roadway
would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or marks on the roadway indicate
in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person every driver of a vehicle shall
obey the directions thereof.''
It would thus appear that before the court would be
justified in giving such an instruction to the jury the
evidence should either show that the intersection was
plainly marked with appropriate signs or marks pursuent
to law or that the facts should show that the intersection
was such that a reasonable and prudent driYer using
due care could have seen it. Such was not the case here.
There is a serious question as to whether this ,,·as
an interseetion as defined by law in any event. Between
the cities of .Monticello and :Moab there are dozens of
jeep trails, private cattle roads, hmnestead road:', nlining
trails, and foot paths etc. which are not designated as
public roads or maintained as such by the county or
state. To hold that all these trails constitute intersections
within the meaning of the law as set forth in the instructions of the lower court would place an undue burden
on travel on the highways of the state and upon the
drivers who use then1.
We respectfully subn1it that the court erred in giving
instruction No.3 ,and that the sole proxi1nate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the respondent in creating
an emergency situation.
2. The Second question of this case is whether
the contributory negligence, if any, could be i1nputed to
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Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet who was riding as a passenger in
the car.
Appellants contend that the court erred in giving
instruction Number 5 to the jury and in refusing to give
defendant's requested instructions 3, 5, ·6, 7, & 8.
Instruction Number 5 is as follows :
"If you find that the Plaintiff was guilty of
negligence which was a proximate cause of the
collision and resulting damage, .and if you further
find that the Defendant was guilty of contributory
negligence which was also a proximate cause of
the collision and resulting damage, then a further
issue you must determine is whether the negligence of the Defendant, Jack I. Gigandet, should
be imputed to the Cross Complainant, Phyllis
Gigandet, on the ground that they were engaged
in a joint venture. In order to find that they were
engaged in a joint venture, you must find from a
preponderance of the evidence that they were engaged in a joint enterprise for a common purpose
.and that they were in joint or common possession
and operation of the automobile in pursuance of
such purpose with both having rights to be heard
in its control and management. If you find such
to be the fact, then they are both responsible for
the operation of the automobile and the contributory negligence, if any, of the Defendant is imputed to the Cross Complainant, his wife, and she
cannot recover.
The mere fact that the Defendant and Cross
Complainant are husband and wife standing .alone
does not give rise to a presumption that they
were engaged in a joint enterprise on the occasion
of the collision. Nor does the fact that the Cross
Complainant w.as not at the wheel of the auto-
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mobile at the time of the collision standing alone
preclude a finding that she and her husband were
engaged in a joint venture of the kind that makes
his negligence imputable to her."
The facts in this c.ase show that :Mr. Gigandet was the
owner of the car involved in the accident and that he was
driving his car at the time of the accident, that he was
the breadwinner of the family, that he and his wife were
on .a vacation trip to Salt Lake City and return home,
that his wife had no income of her own, that !-Irs. Gigandet had driven approxilnately 4 hours during the trip
in seven days of travel, that they proposed to return
home by way of Highway 66 and by way of Dallas, Texas
to visit Mrs. Gigandet's grandmother if the}'" had time,
and that prior to the trip they had made plans for the
trip. There were no other facts relating to control.
A su1nm.ary of the law in Utah relating to this
question is found in Fox vs. Lavender, ________________ Utah

----------------, 56P ( 2) 1053. Justice
court stated in part as follows :

'yolfe speaking for the

"(1) ..... \\'here the owner drives a car himself, he has the direct control over its 1nechanism.
. . . . . The test of whether one is the agent of the
other depends on the right of control of one over
the other ... ~'

and then the court defined control as follows:
''. . . . . Cmnplete control 1neans that the
principal could dictate when the car was to be
used, the destination or where it should go, the
route it should take, and how it should be driven,
whether slow or fast, behind or around traffic
inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc. It is not
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necessary that the principal should be physically
able to so direct or control, but only that he has
the right to. Such legal right of control arises out
of the relationship of master and servant, where
the servant is the operator_ of the car...... " The
The court then continued:
the servant is the operator of the car

"

"(3) .. Joint Ownership-First, if any one,
whether a husb.and or not, was solely the owner
and was driving the car, there would be a very
strong presumption that no one else had control
over his actions. . . . . ''
The fact that a husband and wife .are on a vacation
trip together does not make it a "joint enterprise" or
"common purpose". Nor does it meet the test of community of interest and obligations as will make the trip
an integral part of such venture. The court then concludes:
•' (11) To sum up, when a sole owner is driving it is presumed, without more, that he is in
control and has the complete right of control;

* * *"
As the court points out-.all the presmnptions are
rebuttable by evidence. Another question here is whether
the evidence presented was sufficient to rebut the presumption. Appellants contend that it was not.
We submit that the appellant-Intervenor, Mrs.
Phyllis Gigandet was entitled to have the jury properly
instructed by the court on the law as laid down by Fox
vs. Lavender, Supra, and that in order for the jury to
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fully comprehend the legal problems involved should
have had control defined as therein defined. Such was
the substance of the proposed instructions submitted to
the court by appellants and refused by the court. \Ve
believe this refusal prejudiced the case for :\irs. Gigandet
and reversible error was committed.
CO~CLUSION

We respectfully subn1it that the verdict of the jury
and the judgment of the court as to both appellants
should be set aside and the case re1nanded to the lower
court for a new trial under appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
.A.DA~1S, PETERSOX &
ANDERSOX,

Attorneys for Appellants.
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